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Canaries in the Coal Mine: How the  
Systemic Risk for Financial Firms and Investors 
 






Financial plumbing is taken for granted, except when things go wrong. It was only a few 
years ago, for example, that the Federal Reserve Bank of New York saw the mess in 
the derivatives market, where transactions were recorded on slips of paper and 
sometimes misplaced before the Fed forced the major banks that were part of that 
market to clean up their act. 
 
In this essay, we focus on other parts of the financial plumbing that now must be fixed, 
sooner rather than later. In particular, we address: 
  
 e  to deliver  in mortgage-
backed securities transactions (MBS) and in exchange traded Funds (ETFs); 
 
 the sheer size of the outstanding trades agreed to by counterparties that do not 
settle on time in relation to the liquidity and capitalization of banks and 
intermediary firms; and 
 
 the scale of the systemic risk posed by securities that fail to deliver, and how this 
activity steals value from investor portfolios. 
 
Our central conclusion is this: Every fail introduces a cumulative and potentially 
compounding liquidity risk into the orderly process of settling the $7.5 trillion of security 
transactions completed each day, which could be especially dangerous during times 
when financial institutions are short of liquidity (as was true during the financial crisis of 
2008).  
 
                                            
1 Harold Bradley is Chief Investment Officer of the Kauffman Foundation, where Robert E. Litan is Vice 
President for Research and Policy. Robert A. Fawls and Fred E. Sommers are partners in Basis Point 
Group, a capital markets operations research consulting firm. This essay extends the earlier work of 
Bradley and Litan in 
Unrecognized Risks of Future Market Disruptions, November 12, 2010, available at www.kauffman.org. 
Fawls and Sommers have conducted and published many analyses of capital markets operations risk, 
Wall Street 
Letter Operational Risk & Regulation magazine. This essay extends 
their earlier work on Operations Performance Measurement, a Framework for Success, first published in 
the Citigroup Investment Management Review (February 2006), describing an effective framework for 
measuring the integrity of financial processes. Fawls and Sommers were issued a patent on this 
methodology in August 2009.  
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The settlement fails problem is readily resolvable. Both the Federal Reserve and the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) have penalized fails in the U.S. Treasury 
and equities markets with successful outcomes. The appropriate federal regulators 
therefore should: 
 
 Impose penalties or fees for all transaction fails on all securities types that will 
offset financial gains derived from late settlement of trades, usually at investor 
expense; 
 
 Broaden the reporting of transactions where counterparties fail to deliver on time, 
and include all transaction activity for all major organizations; and 
 
 Improve the analytic framework required to understand how markets are 




Background: Settlement and Settlement  
 
Securities markets work only when the parties to transactions buyers and sellers
honor their commitments. Buyers pay cash, sellers give securities. This is called 
settlement. Fails introduce significant additional unplanned manual effort to correct 
errors and complete transactions in this highly automated clearing and settlement 
process. Fails draw operational focus away from other mission-critical oversight and 
administrative tasks, increasing the risk in other processes that may have no 
relationship to the fail.  
 
This is so fundamental that everyone assumes that all of this works flawlessly, and we 
all take timely settlement for granted. The vast majority of applications used in front 
office operations to analyze, track, and trade securities operate solely on a trade date 
basis. Trade-date based systems assume that all transactions complete successfully on 
the settlement date. These include all high-frequency trading systems and complex 
hedging models. For instance, the Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation (DTCC), 
which is owned by its customers, who are members of the financial community such as 
banks, broker/dealers, and mutual funds, takes for granted efficient settlement and often 
reports trades as to retail and institutional customers on the settlement date 
when the s  DTCC 
assumes things ultimately will work out.  
 
Unfortunately, transactions often do not settle on time they fail because one of the 
Fails happen because one party wants to delay 
settlement to engineer an economic reward and the authorities appear to be letting this 
happen.2 Or, alternatively, a delay or outright failure to settle a transaction occurs 
                                            
2 Dividends, stock voting, and very high interest rates earned for lending securities all are economic 
rewards that can be engineered by customers of custody firms who fail to deliver securities on the 
expected date. 
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More specifically, -trader may 
buy or trade a security with the belief that they effectively hold it in their portfolio or 
inventory because it appears as a settled trade on customer records or is due from 
another firm on or before settlement date but does not arrive. Alternatively, the firm may 
trade a security with the belief that it easily could acquire it before the settlement date 
based on pre- es 
but subsequently finds out the shares are not available to borrow. Counterparties to a 
securities trade who choose not to deliver often do so because there is insufficient 
incentive not to fail  and the firm can earn an incremental fee using the security to 
collateralize a repo or other structured transaction.3 On rare occasions, administrative or 
operational issues may cause a fail, but these are infrequent in relation to the other 
causes. 
  
A complicating matter for both institutional and retail investors in almost all securities 
classes is that the DTCC, the broker-owned clearing house, reports failed trades to 
ecurity entitlements
free to sell, such as with some heavily shorted ETFs. This happens even though the 
have not yet delivered the securities to the custody agent, this leaves institutional and 
retail buyers unaware of the actual ownership status of the securities in question. The 
language of the trade intentionally masquerades failed-to-deliver securities, or IOUs in 
the common vernacular, as something that is neither menacing nor contrary to the 
economic interests of institutional or retail investors.  
 
With respect to ETFs in particular, two of the authors of this paper addressed the 
problem of ETF fails to deliver in a previous paper, where we raised concerns about 
Participant must be able to represent that the shares tendered for redemption are in fact 
in a deliverable state. 4 
required disclosures of failed trades, this creates both a regulatory and retail investor 
problem during times of great systemic stress when the deliverable state of an ETF may 
be impossible to determine in the short run.  
 
As we discuss in more detail below, the ultimate effect of all of these actions, omissions, 
or errors is the same: every fail introduces a cumulative and potentially compounding 
liquidity risk into the orderly process of settling the $7.5 trillion of security transactions 
completed each day.  
 
                                            
3 Michael J. Fleming and Kenneth Garbade, Explaining Settlement Fails  Current Issues in Economics 
and Finance 11, no. 9 (New York: Federal Reserve Bank of New York, September 2005).  
4 See Bradley and Litan, Choking the Recovery, 55. 
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Even under normal trading conditions, the more benign explanations for fails should not 
satisfy regulators. If the failed trades result from intentional failures to settle, then the 
authorities are letting parties game the system at the expense of the beneficial 
securities owners such as state pension funds, mutual funds, and retail investors, who 
all suffer economically as a result of this behavior. If counterparty risk or financial 
solvency leads to failures, and especially at the currently high and rising rate of failures 
in mortgage securities and ETF transactions discussed in greater detail, this should 
warn regulators that markets might be showing signs of duress that can lead to 
systemic crisis such as that experienced in 2008. Already, some may be forgetting that 
large and sophisticated investors were harmed seriously in the aftermath of the 2008 
financial crisis when they learned that large custody agent pools lent their shares to 
failed hedge funds, collateralized by Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns securities that 
became virtually worthless, and ultimately left the pension funds and endowments as 
unwilling creditors in bankruptcy proceedings. Fails thus represent a true canary in the 
coal mine of the financial markets.  
 
 
The Disturbing Rise in Settlement Fails in Mortgage Securities and Exchange 
Traded Funds 
 
There have been worrying patterns of settlement fails in equity and Treasury securities 
in the past. Regulators and industry organizations investigated the reasons for these 
failures and imposed solutions that greatly reduced the fail rate, eliminated the ability to 
game the system,  and dramatically reduced risks in these asset classes.  
 
The Fed, through the Treasury Market Practices Group (TMPG), imposed a 3 percent 
fails charge on all Treasury settlement failures. Likewise, the SEC in 2008 and 2009 
also heavily penalized the practice by requiring failing brokers in equities transactions to 
purchase or borrow the securities by the morning of the fourth day after the transaction 
(T+4). If brokers did not fulfill this obligation they were required to pre-borrow securities 
on all future short transactions, which gave brokers very strong incentives to settle up.5 
Both the Fed and SEC actions reduced fails substantially in Treasury markets and in 
individual equity securities, indicating that traders in financial markets had previously 
been gaming the system. For years, Wall Street trading interests had lobbied against 
such penalties, attributing such failures to technical problems and record-keeping 
glitches. History shows this was not an accurate representation of failed trades.  
 
Unfortunately, like squeezing a balloon, the fails problem has not gone away. It simply 
has moved to markets where fails are not punished. For example, the Treasury 
primary dealers reported that in all but five weeks during 2010, sellers of 
Treasury, MBS, agency, and corporate fixed income securities failed to deliver each day 
                                            
5 In October 2008, the SEC adopted temporary Rule 204T of Regulation SHO, and made the rule 
fails to deliver securities on settlement date, in effect the seller unilaterally converts a securities contract 
-type contract, to which the buyer might not have agreed, or that might have 
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an average of $130 billion of securities on the expected settlement date, a number so 
large that it exceeds the combined $89 billion regulatory capital of these institutions. 
During the week of November 24, 2010, daily fails of these securities exceeded primary 
dealer regulatory capital by more than two-and-a-half times.  
 
In the same week, the primary dealers reported to the Federal Reserve that total MBS 
fails exceeded $1.3 trillion, an amount never before recorded in the more than fifteen 
years the Fed has collected data. This is the third time fails exceeded $1 trillion in less 
than six months during 2010, which continues a pattern of increasing MBS fails that has 
evolved since May 2009 when a penalty was put in place to stop persistent fails of 





It is impossible to know without more compulsory data reporting by the primary dealers 
and custodians exactly what accounts for these patterns, or whether regulators even 
are 
evident from the sheer size of the numbers and the potential impact on any 
to continue operations if it were forced to honor commitments in these transactions 
during another crisis in either liquidity or counterparty confidence.  
 
Another major liquidity problem may be simmering given the rising frequency of fails in 
ETF securities. Currently, ETF fails account for approximately 60 percent of the nearly 
$2 billion of daily equity trading fails reported to the SEC, and on some days they 
account for 90 percent of all exchange traded fails. Understanding the cause of ETF 
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fails is even more complex given the number of intermediaries involved in the creation, 
marketing, sale, pricing, and safekeeping of ETF securities. Mandatory reporting for 
each of six legal entities6 involved in the daily maintenance of each ETF security would 
assure that investors understand the inherent risks in the wide range of ETF 
construction and trading strategies.7  
 
As we discuss further below, it is anomalous that ETF fails apparently are not subject to 
the same kinds of penalties that the SEC has imposed on settlement failures for equities 
in footnote 5 makes no specific mention of ETFs, 
implying that they are exempt from the rule). Promoters of ETFs liken them to stocks 
since they easily can be traded and sold at all times like stocks (even though in their 
portfolio composition ETFs more closely resemble mutual funds, which are not tradable 
and rely on basket creation and destruction, which may be difficult in a liquidity crisis). It 
is somewhat surprising to us that in addressing settlement failures for all equities, the 
SEC has not yet insisted on including ETF fails within its current rules. We suggest 
below ways of fixing that particular problem.   
 
In short, except for the fees for Treasury security fails and the 
relating to equity fails, dealers are not required to take any charge against fails for other 
financial instruments until five days after settlement. All money market, fixed income, 
and equity trades are mandated to settle at the trade date plus one, two, or three days. 
Only after T-plus-eight days does the SEC specify that a government securities 
interdealer broker shall deduct from net worth ¼ of 1 percent of the contract value of 
each government securities failed-to-deliver contract which is outstanding 5 business 
days or longer. Such deduction shall be increased by any excess of the contract price of 
the failed-to-deliver contract over the market value of the underlying security 8 The 
regulatory capital charge on a primary dealer for a failed MBS and ETF transaction is 
thus negligible. Custodians, the other major players in the game, suffer no penalties or 
charges against capital for any form of fails. Consequently, the regulatory treatment of 
failed-to-deliver securities today creates a system whereby Wall Street trades for free 
while the parties to securities transactions unwittingly finance the highly 
profitable trading activities.  
 
 
Putting Settlement Fails in Perspective 
 
There are several ways to assess the significance of the current volume of fails. None 
are comforting.  
 
                                            
6 These include fund sponsors, fund distributor, custodian, authorized participant, investment managers, 
and transfer agents.  
7 This issue takes on added urgency in the wake of media reports that the SEC is investigating hedge 
er trading through use of ETF securities. See 
http://seekingalpha.com/news-article/575004-of-etfs-and-stripping. 
8 The level was set in 1987. See 15 U.S.C. 78o 5(b)(1)(A), (b)(4). 
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As just noted, the daily level of fails during 2010 exceeded the combined regulatory 
capital for all of the U.S. g primary dealers as well as the total shareholder 
equity of the major custodian banks in that year.  
 
Another way to understand the impact of fails is through the dynamics of the transaction 
markets. We conduct this analysis by reviewing, in turn, data on both the amounts of 
securities outstanding and then their transactions volumes. 
 
Securities outstanding: The latest data from globalcustody.net 
(www.globalcustody.net) shows that the total value of assets in custody accounts for the 
fifty-four reporting custodians is $108 trillion. The market values for each of the major 





Table 1 shows that core U.S. securities markets total just over $46 trillion in assets. 
Foreign equity markets constitute another $ 27 trillion in assets. The remaining $35 
trillion of assets consists of foreign fixed income and OTC equities.  
 
Securities Transactions: In 2009, the last period for which figures currently are 
available, there were a minimum of $1.48 quadrillion in security transactions. This 
activity includes trades and financing transactions completed through DTCC, which 
does not capture all transaction activity. Treasury and agency securities totaled $905 
trillion ($0.9 quadrillion)9 or 61 percent of this total volume. The 2009 activity level 
declined 18 percent from 2008, the year of the market crash, when DTCC processed 
$1.88 quadrillion.  
 
                                            
9 The value of U.S. fixed income securities transactions is reported quarterly by SIFMA (Securities 
Industry and Financial Markets Association). The World Federation of Exchanges (WFE) reports the value 
of equity transactions monthly. Depository Trust Clearing Corporation (DTCC) publishes transaction 
volume figures in its annual report. 
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How significant are these trading levels? Using  activity levels as a conservative 
estimate, the total value of issued Treasury and agency securities turned over ninety-
four times during 2009. This means that the issued securities changed hands at least 
once every 2.6 business days. This is an extraordinary transaction flow for securities 
that generally are held in portfolio long term by foreign treasuries, institutional investors, 
and pension funds. Generally, the faster a system or process moves, the higher the 
probability that a disruption will cause a catastrophic breakdown. 
 
Table 2 shows the 2009 transaction activity and turnover rates for each of the major 
securities markets. The total issued value of Treasury and agency securities turned over 
every two to three days during the period 2005 9. Mortgage securities turned over 
every three trading weeks and equities, corporate bonds, and ETFs turned over every 
five trading weeks. The extraordinary velocity of assets flowing through trading 
intermediaries heightens concerns about systemic risk during periods of duress and any 




Note: DTCC reports the Treasury and agency market and the equity, corporate bond, and ETF market 




Market Activity and Settlement Failures: With these baseline figures in mind, it now is 
useful to return to settlement failures, which are delinquent obligations that one party 
has to another party. Outstanding fails to deliver for both the average and worst days in 
2010 are shown in the following table:10 
 








The first column in Table 3 is the average daily failure rate for each asset type 
expressed in basis points of the total issued value reported for that asset type. 
Assuming 250 trading days per year, this index allows us to calculate the total value of 





Failed mortgage trades stand out as the major problem, accounting for more than 46 
percent of the total mortgage-backed securities issued. In absolute value, $2.6 trillion in 
mortgage securities failed during 2010. ETFs also stand out because they fail at a rate 
that is forty times higher than other exchange traded equities (3.8 percent vs. 0.1 
percent for equities). This may imply that the main trading firms, which act as agents or 
intermediaries, are making money on fails of assets owned by others.  
 
(BPG) research shows that the delays caused by settlement 
failures and other accounting recognition delays result in hidden costs to beneficial 
owners of assets of as much as twenty-seven basis points every day, or about $300 
billion in assets that cannot be reinvested. At a conservative annual interest rate of 3 
percent, this estimate implies that currently, underfunded pension funds and other 
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institutional investors are losing $9 billion annually to settlement failures. Investors are 
underwriting this transfer to trading profits on Wall Street as one part of this endemic 
fail-to-deliver problem being overlooked by regulators.  
 
Basis Point Group tracks market fails using publicly available data going as far back as 
1990 for some markets. Figure 2 shows that the trend in fails of all asset types has been 
steadily increasing since mid-1996. Until recently, Treasuries dominated the fail-to-





Two things are obvious from this graphic: The pattern of fails is volatile and the level of 
fails has gotten worse. The grey line shows the trend.11 Whether the rise in fails is 
driven by increased trading, collateralization, short-term financing, or simple bad 
behavior is unknown. We suggest that failures now are at a level that presents 
significant systemic risk to all investors in the event of another market shock. The Fed, 




Fails Shift from Stocks and Treasury Bonds to MBS and ETFs 
 
In May 2009, the Federal Reserve placed a penalty on settlement fails of Treasury 
securities. Figure 3 shows that failures in this market have been virtually eliminated 
since then. 
                                            
11 The trend is calculated as a straight line using standard regression techniques.  
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Not so with mortgage securities. To the contrary, since 2008, when mortgage failures 
averaged $10.6 billion per day, failures in this market have climbed steadily, reaching 





With no penalty for failing MBS securities and with the government takeover of Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac effectively guaranteeing the principal risk by the Treasury, there 
is little incentive to correct a fail quickly. The Treasury (and by extension the taxpayer) 
will be obligated to intervene again in the event of another liquidity crisis. Investors and 
taxpayers who are unaware the game is being played with their funds will be the 
ultimate losers.  
 
While ETF failures are magnitudes of order smaller than MBS failures, they have the 
possibility of being the first in a string of dominoes to fall in a crisis. ETFs are highly 
visible but their failures provide one of the best examples of things not being as they 
seem.  ETFs are marketed and sold as exchange traded equity securities that have all 
the diversification advantages of a mutual fund with unlimited supply and they can be 
traded (and shorted) throughout the day. Investors have been lulled into the belief that 
ETFs are just like equities through repeated assurances from brokers and the issuers.  
 
As an example, illiquid small cap companies are being repackaged in index ETFs such 
as the IWM, which derives its value from the stocks in the Russell 2000 index. 
Unfortunately, just because they are a component of a heavily traded ETF, the 
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underlying securities do not suddenly become liquid. The situation is analogous to the 
packaging of substandard MBS and asset-backed pools in more easily traded 
securities, which did not magically transform bad mortgages into high quality paper. 
Wall Street instead obfuscated the risk in a manner that was nearly impossible for the 
reasonable professional investor to discover. Some ETFs may be manifesting the same 
problem in a different way. This is the fatal assumption in tightly coupled systems.  
 
Recent events notably ongoing concerns about sovereign debt in Greece, Ireland, and 
possibly other European countries and the unrest in the Middle East reinforce 
concerns about potential systemic risk. Investors have been sold an idea that they need 
ETFs. As the May 6, 2010 Flash Crash  demonstrated, selling of ETFs mutates rapidly 
into the destruction of the value of underlying stocks. The financial crisis of 2008 
convincingly demonstrated that risk is contagious: markets with an unexpected failure 
quickly infect other markets and other asset categories. 
 
We are not the first to highlight the ETF fails problem. Roughly a year before the 
financial crisis, Professor Jim Angel of Georgetown University warned the SEC 





                                            
12 Regulation SHO is a government-mandated report 
rates as high as 30 percent interest charges per year for a common stock, as in the Tesla Motors 
example previously cited (see Bradley and Litan, Choking the Recovery), before a short seller can 
transact in the security.  
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Table 5 shows that in 2010 some of the largest ETFs (SPY, XLF, and XLI) had the 
highest failure rates, often exceeding 240 out of 250 trading days.13   
 
In normal trading environments, liquidity risk is invisible and the instability caused by 
fails remains unseen below the surface of markets operations. Liquidity risk in equities 
markets is evident from the extremely high rate at which settlement of ETF buy 
transactions fail because the stock is not delivered to the owners. Whether failures 
occur because insufficient units are created or because the short sellers cannot locate 
someone willing to lend them stock for the trade is irrelevant. Investors have been 
promised that they can claim their money at a reasonable and immediate value. This 
may be a promise breaks.  
 
 
Why Fails to Receive and Fails t  
 
One other consideration should give pause to regulators who might naively assume that 
market participants are sufficiently well capitalized with access to sufficient liquidity. 
There is a widely held belief by both audit firms and regulatory officials that failures to 
receive securities offset failures to deliver. These parties take for granted that the 
financial system plumbing is in good condition and that all actors in the game behave 
responsibly and ethically.  
 
This assumption is simplistic and poses potentially dangerous systemic risks. To 
understand why, consider first two key points that have come out 
research and other academic research.14 The first is that the average time to cure a fail 
is approximately fifteen days. The second is that only 35 percent of fails to deliver are 
offset by a failure to receive.15 
 
The systemic risk issues should be obvious. If dealers fail to settle $130 billion to $253 
billion per day and the normal time required to resolve failures is fifteen days, then the 
Treasury must stand ready to supply $2 trillion or more to the securities markets to keep 
markets liquid and buy time for market intermediaries to acquire and deliver against 
their commitments if one or more major counterparties fail, as occurred with Lehman 
Brothers.  
 
Treasury security fails exceeded 50 percent of the total issuance at the peak of the 
crisis in 2008. MBS fails are harder to correct, and it is reasonable to expect that in any 
crisis fails will spike and the liquidity of specific firms may be seriously affected. Equally 
lures persist longer than 
most other asset types because of the complexity of MBS settlement. BPG analyzed the 
                                            
13 -To- National Securities Clearing Corporation.  
14 Naked Short-  (paper presented 
at the 66th International Atlantic Economic Conference, Montreal, Canada, October 12, 2008, which 
found that fails persisted for sixteen days). 
15 
same security, the same par, or shares on the same day. 
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trading books of one major financial organization and documented that mortgage fails 
averaged sixty-three days despite firm risk summaries that showed the weighted 
average settlement delay for fails at only fifteen days. 
 
The foregoing receive-deliver fails offset figures also are concerning because they 
mean that 65 percent . 16 Institutional Investors have 
pulled back from securities lending, making it harder for market makers to acquire 
securities that may have been easily borrowed in the past. Increased trading and 
financing activity associated with high frequency trading and derivative hedge strategies 
only worsens the high-quality security supply problem, decreasing the resiliency of the 
markets and increasing the overall risk to the system.  
 
Finally, there is a lopsided risk-reward dynamic embedded in the structure of current 
fails regulations. Capital markets firms can increase profits while laying off the risk 
associated with these profits to investors, the Treasury, and ultimately the taxpayers. 
 
 
Implications for Regulators 
 
We do not know if regulators are aware of these specific market failure patterns, or their 
potential causes. It also is unclear which regulators have responsibility for assessing the 
 and stability. Consistent with the analysis above, there 
are two alternative possibilities, or some combination of the two: 
 
1. Regulators are either unintentionally or intentionally allowing parties, most likely 
sellers of securities, to game the system and squeeze out extra earnings. Failing 
to deliver a security to one party and re-hypothecating it to another party for a 
short period of time is one method of generating additional returns. In the case of 
mortgage securities in particular, it is necessary to ask if this approach might be 
a deliberate tactic employed by the Fed to allow banks to reflate their balance 
sheets.   
 
2. Alternatively, rising fails could be canaries in the coal mine of financial markets, 
telegraphing that parties to ETFs and mortgage-backed securities transactions 
are having problems completing their trades. Markets for borrowing securities, 
especially mortgages and those supporting small cap ETFs, may be drying up.  
 
In either case, 
hyperkinetic trading interests and stiffly fine traders who do not meet their contractual 
and legal obligations to settle trades on time.  
 
 
                                            
16 While the data supporting the 35 percent number is narrow (one month of months data for one 
anonymous dealer), the analysis included more than 795,000 transactions totaling $7.8 trillion dollars in 





Fortunately, there are several clear and obvious remedies to the fails situation. The 
appropriate regulatory authorities should: 
 
 Impose substantial penalties or fees for all transaction fails. 
 
 It worked in equities and for Treasuries: make all financial instruments, and 
especially mortgage securities and ETFs, face large fines for settlement 
failure; 
 Put the regulatory onus on the custody banks, the top five of whom control 60 
percent of $67 trillion in client assets; 
 Make custody banks post capital sufficient to cover all failed client trades 
every day; 
 Make penalties sufficiently large that they more than offset any gains parties 
may realize from not delivering securities or not paying for them by the 
settlement due date; and 
 Make penalties take varying forms, such as stiff or increasing fines for every 
day an MBS trade or ETF trade fails to deliver. It is possible that the SEC (for 
ETFs) and the Fed (for MBS) already may have legal authority to implement 
appropriate penalties, but if each agency does not believe it does, it should 
immediately ask Congress for that authority. The rules that govern the timely 
settlement of securities trades are clear; the enforcement mechanisms 
appear quite muddy.  
 
 Establish broader fails reporting, and include all transaction activity for 
systemically important financial institutions, especially primary custody banks, in 
a manner similar to that required by U.S. Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
from U.S. primary dealers: 
 
 Report aggregate dollar value of securities lending pools by asset class on a 
monthly basis so that investors and regulators might anticipate shifts of the 
security supply and its implications for market stability (as customers often 
quit lending at the beginning of serious liquidity crises); 
 Report fails-to-receive securities and stratify by customer segment; 
 Report fails-to-deliver securities and stratify by customer segment; 
 Delineate fails data according to custody bank business lines, e.g. trading, 
securities lending, and financing (repurchase service); and 
 
 
Time to Change the Framework for Analyzing Systemic Risk in Financial Markets 
 
There are sufficient data available at the clearing organizations to create a new analytic 
framework and structure for assessing systemic risk implications of new instruments or 
trading strategies. Consultants for BPG understand that operations staff at major 
financial firms have long counseled against many of the more complex, multileg deal 
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structures. The operational complexity of tightly coupled systems depends on a daisy 
chain of intermediaries doing the right thing at the right time. This does not often happen 
during market crisis. Most front office and senior managers may not understand and 
often ignore the extent of incremental manual labor required to settle complex trades, as 
in mortgage securities.  
 
Accordingly, regulators must initiate an analysis to determine how transaction fails 
propagate through the system and how the volumes of collateralization, repo financing, 
and capitalization affect market prices. Regulators serve an important role in 
safeguarding investor confidence in capital markets. Today we know that bad behavior 
and gaming the system based on operational deficiencies imposes a performance 
 We cannot afford to wait 
until the next crisis to resolve these dangerous and leaky pipes in our financial system.  
 
 
